I. First Soviet Counteroffensive

The Russians launched their counterattack on 6 December, savagely throwing hordes of raw troops in fierce local counterattacks. But these were all local attacks, the Russian commanders lacking the skill to conduct large-scale, coordinated operations and were short of heavy weapons of all kinds. Still the ferocity and weight of the battle put the German Army officially on the defensive on 8 December, and both Army Groups North and Center were pushed back considerably, the latter to the line it held on 15 November.
Despite the winter snow and winds that swept the steppes of Moscow, the VVS made a valiant appearance in the Russian skies to support their troops below. Under the overall command of General Pavel F. Zhigarev, VVS aircraft of the Kalinin, Bryansk, Western, and Southwestern Fronts harried the retreating Germans, claiming the destruction of a fair portion of enemy equipment. For example, the Western Front Air Force mounted 5,066 sorties early in the battle against General Guderian’s Second Panzer Army east of the Tula. To the northwest, the Kalinin Front Air Force hit German artillery and troop positions opposing the advancing Soviet Thirty-first Army. After the city Kalinin was captured, the aircraft from this air force went on to assist five armies advancing towards Rzhev. Between 17 and 26 December, VVS aircraft mounted 1,289 sorties in this area, through reconnaissance, close-support, and occasional interdiction strikes, claiming the destruction of sixteen German aircraft.
Aircraft from the Moscow-based IA-PVO added weight to the efforts of VVS frontal aviation. Under the command of Pulkovnik A. I. Mitenkov, the 6 IAK switched to ground-attack sorties as the threat of aerial bombardment of the capital decreased. Mitenkov’s fighters strafed and bombed groups of German soldiers as they withdrew from the outskirts of Moscow, particularly in the Klin and Solnechnogorsk areas. Also elements from the DBA and two reserve air groups flew sorties to assist the advance.
The Luftwaffe, meanwhile, found itself hard-pressed to challenge the VVS’ energetic, if limited, operations. The icy climate had grounded much of the air force, and when weather conditions permitted flying, all available aircraft were slaved to directly supporting the hard-pressed army. Oberleutnant Hermann Plocher, the Chief of Staff of Fliegerkorps V, well summarized the air forces’ predicament:

Soviet counterattacks tied down the flying units of the [Luftwaffe] as well as the ground forces of [the German Army]. As was generally true over the whole of the Eastern Front, the Army was weak in artillery, especially anti-aircraft guns, and required almost constant support by the Luftwaffe. Frequent critical situations in which the German ground forces found themselves made them increasingly dependent on air power. Because of this, the Luftwaffe became operationally linked to almost every ground undertaking at the front.

The German Army’s complete dependence on air power for even the simplest tasks had considerable repercussions for the Luftwaffe. Air force flak batteries found themselves increasingly impressed into service as the army’s artillery and anti-tank components, rather than their intended anti-aircraft duty. Also the lack of adequate ground-attack aircraft meant that He 111 and Ju 88 medium bombers were forced into the ground attack role, where these large and costly aircraft suffered high attrition from small arms and anti-aircraft fire.
By the beginning of the new year, a crisis loomed over the entire German war effort on the Eastern Front. On 5 January 1942 the Soviets launched a general counteroffensive, planning four large-scale simultaneous attacks: (1) twin thrusts in the central theater to envelope Army Group Center and drive the Germans from Moscow, (2) renewed attacks in the northern theater to lift the siege of Leningrad, (3) a drive to capture the Donetz Basin in the Ukraine, and (4) combined sea and land invasions to liberate the Crimea and Black Sea coasts.
At first the Soviet offensive succeeded in turning back large segments of the German Army. In the far north, heavy attacks were launched into Finland and Norway. In the north the Russians had pushed a gap into Rzhev, threatening to split Army Groups North and South. In the central theater a double pincer was developing, one arm threatening to envelope the Third Panzer and Ninth Armies at Vyazma, the other driving east of Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga to form a wedge between the Second Panzer and Fourth Armies. To the south Soviet armies under Marshal Semen K. Timoshenko broke through the German lines at Izyum, pushing fifty miles inwards and threatening to capture the vital rail junction at Dnepropetrovsk. Finally in the far south, Russian forces had invaded the Crimea and threatened to cut off and destroy the Eleventh Army.
VVS operations in support of the advance were limited but helpful. During the first three days of battle, Soviet aircraft flew 16,000 sorties, half of which were ground attack missions. Occasionally Russian pilots scored successfully against German airfields, such as a raid against airdromes at Rzhev and Velikiye Luki in early January. On this occasion, fighters of the 5 Gv.IAP and 193 IAP caught a number of transports on the runway, claiming the destruction of nine Ju 52/3ms on the ground and one Do 217 in the air. But despite these occasional successes Soviet air operations did not inflict severe damage on either German air or ground forces.